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Abstract
This paper argues that an increasing block pricing structure needs to be supple-
mented by allowances for household size and composition to be equitable. House-
hold behaviour is modelled as the outcome of a two-stage budgeting resulting in
an integrable water demand model. The welfare eﬀects of block pricing are studied
using the concept of relative equivalence scale, modiﬁed to allow for the dependence
of price on household size and composition. We use individual household data to
estimate residential demand for water, provide empirical illustration of the welfare
eﬀects of increasing block pricing on demographically diﬀerent households and show
how these eﬀects can be compensated.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Block pricing and other forms of complex pricing methods are often used in regulated
industries to satisfy a variety of objectives, involving both demand-side and supply-side
eﬃciency and equity concerns (Hewitt 2000). In the case of water a standard practice
in arid regions is to apply an increasing block pricing structure consisting of a ﬁxed part
that is independent of the amount of water consumed and a variable part that consists
of a sequence of marginal prices for diﬀerent blocks of quantity consumed.
This increasing block pricing structure is argued to signal rising supply costs and
encourage conservation. It is also argued to be equitable because low income households
pay lower rates of water than other households (Maddock and Castano 1991). The latter
argument can be criticised on the grounds that water consumption is aﬀected not only
by income but also by a number of other, equally important, factors, such as the size and
composition of the household, the type of the residence, whether or not the household
owns a garden or electrical appliances that use water for cleaning purposes (e.g. washing
machine), and many other factors. Whittington (1992) shows that in overcrowded areas
increasing block tariﬀ can be regressive if the tariﬀ blocks consist of a small number
of big blocks with a small price diﬀerence between them, and proposes the setting of a
minimum charge for a consumption level suﬃcient to cover basic needs.
In this paper we question the argument that increasing block pricing is equitable on
the grounds that when households vary in size and age structure the notion of income
is no longer equivalent to the notion of welfare. Therefore, to be equitable an increasing
block price structure applied to residential use of water needs to be supplemented by
allowances for the extra burden of this pricing structure associated with family size
and age composition. As a money metric measure of these allowances we propose the
relative equivalence scale, the relative compensation required by demographically dif-
ferent households to maintain the same level of utility under two diﬀerent price regimes
(Blundell and Lewbel 1991).
Estimation of the relative equivalence scale requires modeling consumer behaviour in
the context of a utility maximisation framework, yet the presence of an increasing block
pricing structure invalidates the application of standard consumer theory tools for the
derivation of demand for water. This problem, discussed extensively in the literature of
water demand (e.g. Hewitt and Hanemann 1995), arises because the marginal price paid
for water is no longer exogenous to the choice of water consumption, with consequences
similar to those considered in labour supply (Hausman 1985, Moﬃtt 1986, 1990) and
2other cases where the budget constraint is not linear, for example in electricity (Reiss
and White 2001) and recycling (Hong and Adams 1999). A further diﬃculty in the
context of our analysis arises from the fact that in order to construct a measure of the
welfare eﬀects of increasing block pricing, such as the relative equivalence scale, one
needs a model of demand for water satisfying integrability, i.e. the ability to recover
the indirect utility function from the parameters of this model.
To cope with the price endogeneity and integrability problems described above, we
model household demand for water as the outcome of a two-stage budgeting procedure.
Price endogeneity is accounted for at the top budgeting stage by allowing the price
block a household is consuming at to depend on a income, demographic characteristics,
housing type and size, possession of washing machine and dishwasher and many other
household speciﬁc variables. Integrability is accounted for at the second budgeting stage
by modelling demand for water in the context of the Quadratic Logarithmic Demand
System of Banks, Blundell and Lewbel (1997). Notably, this demand system not only
is consistent with utility maximisation theory but also general enough to allow for non-
linear income eﬀects found to be statistically signiﬁcant in the empirical analysis of
individual household data (Blundell, Pashardes and Weber 1993).
The structure of the paper is as follows. The next section describes the utility
maximisation framework in the context of which we model demand for water and con-
sider the welfare implications of increasing block pricing for demographically diﬀerent
households. Section 3 applies the proposed model to individual household data to es-
timate residential demand for water and the relative equivalence scales showing how
demographic diﬀerences between households should be compensated under an increas-
ing block price regime. Section 4 concludes the paper.
2 Block selection, expenditure and welfare
Under the assumption that prices are ﬁxed a system of equations representing con-
sumer demand for goods can be obtained by maximising the (direct) utility function
U (q1,q 2,...,q I) subject to the budget constraint Σipiqi = y,w h e r eqi is the quantity
and pi the price of good i =1 ,...,I; or, equivalently, by mininising the cost function C(
p1,p 2,...,p I,U).
A block pricing system invalidates this procedure because it renders the budget con-
straint piece-wise linear. Taylor (1975) was proposes a method circumventing this prob-
3lem by allocating consumers to the linear segments of the budget constraint where the
standard utility maximisation (cost minimisation) tools are applicable. Thus, assuming
that block pricing applies to the ﬁrst commodity and denoting the marginal price (the
price paid for the last unit of consumption) by p∗, Taylor’s approach amounts to minimis-
ing the cost function C( p∗,p 2,...,p I,U), yielding commodity demands qi(p∗,p 2,...,p I,y).
Nordin (1976) argues that in empirical application y must be modiﬁed to correspond to
p∗, by subtracting the excess of the actual total payment for the commodity in question
over what the total payment would have been if the marginal price had prevailed in
all blocks.1 Other investigators suggest that p∗ should also be treated as endogenous
because under block pricing the marginal price is aﬀected by quantity demanded (Agthe
et al 1986, Deller et al 1986, Nieswiadomy and Molina 1989).
2.1 Block selection
Here, we follow an approach that deals with problems associated with block pricing
regimes in a complete demand system context and using a theoretical framework con-
sistent with the fundamentals of consumer behaviour. Our approach rationalises the
Taylor-Nordin procedure and price endogeneity as outcomes of a two-stage decision
process: ﬁrst consumers select a block (price tariﬀ) at which they wish to consume,
thereby locating themselves to a particular linear segment along the budget constraint;
and then select the point along this segment which maximises their utility. Below we
describe this two-stage budgeting procedure using implicit separability, i.e. assuming
that goods enter the cost function partitioned into groups where each group has its own
subcost function deﬁned on total utility.2
We concentrate on consumer demand for a single commodity with a block pricing
structure and consider all other goods as a Hicksian composite good with a given price
P. Under implicit separability the cost function describing consumer’s preferences can
be written as
C(p,x,P,U)=G[c1 (p1,P,U),......,cM (pM,P,U),x,U], (1)
1If there are only two linear segments along the budget constraint, then y
1 = p
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2In contrast, the more popular concept of weak separability implies that the group subcost functions
are deﬁned on group subutility - see Deaton and Muellbauer (1980). Also, Moﬃtt (1990) provides a
comprehensive literature review of the various approaches to dealing with non-linearities in the budget
constraint.
4where pm, m =1 ,...,M is the mth block price of the commodity of interest, cm (.)a
sub-function reﬂecting the unit cost of consumption corresponding to the mth block
price, and x a vector of exogenous variables aﬀecting the choice of block. Thus, cm (.),
m =1 ,...,M,can be thought of as the linear segments of the budget constraint.3
In this context consumer demand for the commodity of interest at the mth block










where ∂G[.]/∂cm (.) represents consumer demand for consumption at the mth block
price level, and ∂cm (.)/∂pm the quantity demanded conditional on the block selection.
Thus, ∂G[.]/∂cm (.)r e ﬂects the choice of a linear segment of the budget constraint and
∂cm (.)/∂pm the choice of a point along this segment.
At the ﬁrst budgeting stage we assume that consumers consider the unit cost cm (.)
as given, and select to consume at the level minimising the Cobb-Douglas cost function
C(p,x,P,U)=Πmcm(.)θm(x)U, (3)
where θm(x) ≥ 0 for concavity and Σmθm(x) = 1 for adding up.





and substituting U for the indirect utility function, y/Πmcm(.)θm(x), where y the level







This demand can also be deﬁned in budget share form, wm ≡ pmqm/Y, by multiplying





In empirical application θm(x)c a nb ed e ﬁned as the probability of selecting to consume
at the level corresponding to the mth block price. Assuming that when θm(x)=1w h e n
3For analytical convenience, at the moment we assume that all households have the same preferences.
This assumption is relaxed in the empirical analysis below, where the parameters in (1) are allowed to
vary with observable household characteristics.
5consumption at the mth block price is selected and θm(x) = 0 otherwise, demand for the
commodity of interest can be obtained in the form of a budget share equation by taking
the derivative of the logarithm of the cost sub-function cm(.) with respect to lnpm.
In the context described above, lnpm is the outcome of the ﬁrst stage optimisation
(the selection of consumption at the mth block price), and should be treated as an
endogenous variable in empirical application. Below we use a reduced form equation
pm = fm(x) to account for this endogeneity problem. Notably, this equation can be
identiﬁed separately from the budget share equation (6) because: (a) the level of con-
sumer’s income can be included in the x vector, on the grounds that the selection of
block is determined at a higher budgeting stage (as opposed the budget share which
is determined at the lower budgeting stage and is aﬀected by the level of consumer’s
budget, y, instead); and (b) fm(x) need not have the same functional form as the budget
share equation.
2.2 Budget share
We shall model consumer expenditure on the commodity of interest as the budget share
equation corresponding to the Quadratic Almost Ideal Demand System (QUAIDS) pro-
posed by Banks, Blundell and Lewbel (1997). The QUAIDS model belongs to the family
of rank-3 demand systems, the most general empirical representation of consumer pref-
erences that satisﬁes integrability (the ability to recover the parameters of the indirect
utility function from empirical demand analysis; Gorman 1980 and Lewbel 1991).4
Let us assume that the price corresponding to the block chosen by the hth consumer
at the top budgeting stage is p∗
h. Following standard practice we shall term p∗
h as the
marginal price in the sense that it applies to demand at the margin of consumption.
At the moment we shall take p∗
h as given and assume that consumer preferences at the














where the price indices a(p∗
h,P),b (p∗
h,P)a n dg (p∗
h,P) are linearly independent and
4Here we have chosen to use a rank-3 demand system because (i) lower rank demand systems are
found to be inadequate to capture the nonlinear income eﬀects pertaining to individual household data
(Blundell, Pashardes and Weber 1993 and Pashardes 1995), and (ii) integrability will enable us to
investigate the welfare implications of alternative pricing policies on empirical grounds.
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h + λ1 lnP.
Imposing adding-up (a+a1 =1 , β +β1 =0 , λ+λ1 =1 , γ +γ21 =0 ,γ1 +γ12 =0 ) ,
homogeneity (γ + γ12 =0 , γ21 + γ1 =0 )a n ds y m m e t r y( γ12 = γ21), substituting in
(7) and taking the derivative with respect to lnp∗
h, we obtain the Hicksian budget share
equation



























=l nyh − [ao + aln(p∗
h/P)+l nP + .5γ(lnp∗
h/P)2],
where yh in the budget of hth consumer.
Substituting in (9) we obtain the Marshallian budget share of water







where lnYh = lnyh − [ao + aln(p∗
h/P)+l nP + .5γ(lnp∗
h/P)2].
We deﬁne the price of water paid by the hth household as ph = p0sh where p0 is
the producer’s price and sh =( 1+ th), where −1 <t h < 0 is the surcharge paid
and 0 <t h < 1 the subsidy received by the hth consumer as a proportion of the
producer’s price. When the latter and the prices of all goods other than water for
domestic consumption are ﬁxed, as in cross-section analysis, we can normalise to p∗
h = sh
and P = 1 (i.e. measure prices using their producer’s level as base).6 We can then write
(10) as
wh = a + γ lnsh + β
h













5The general forms of these price indices are: a(p)=ao+Σiailnpi+.5ΣiΣjγijlnpjlnpi,b(p)=Πip
βi
i ,
and g(p)=Σiλilnpi. For more explanation about these and other properties of the QUAIDS model,
interested readers are referred to Banks, Blundell and Lewbel (1997).
6The budget share equations are homothetic of degree zero in prices. This implies that the units in
which prices are measured are irrelevant - see Deaton and Muellbauer (1980b, chr 2) for this and other
properties of demand systems.
7where sh reﬂects the surcharge paid (sh > 1) or subsidy received (sh < 1) at the margin
of consumption, as deﬁned above.7
2.3 Welfare eﬀects
We use the QUAIDS demand system described above to investigate the welfare
eﬀects of block pricing on households with diﬀerent demographic characteristics and
consider money metric measures to compute these eﬀects. We allow for the eﬀects of













where zh is the vector of demographic and other household characteristics. To the extent
that demographic characteristics also aﬀect the choice of block at the ﬁrst optimisation
stage, p∗
h is also a function of zh and other exogenous variables, p∗
h = p∗(xh,zh).












































and the decoration ‘ ’ over expenditure yh and the price functions ah,b h and gh denote
their values at Uh = uh.
The true cost of living index (13) measures the change in expenditure required by the
household facing post-surcharge (-subsidy) prices p∗
h to obtain the same level of utility







































Evaluated at sh = 1 these elasticity formulas simplify to (1/wh)(β +2 λlnxh)+1 a n d
(1/wh)[γ − βa − (2λa + λβ)lnxh] − 1, respectively.
8as at pre-surcharge (-subsidy) prices p0. It can be computed for a given household with
characteristics zh facing a change in price from p0 to p∗
h it can be computed at a given
utility level uh, as deﬁned above, using the parameter estimates of the explicit functional
forms of the price functions ah,b h and gh.
To compare the eﬀect of the surcharge (subsidy) on household welfare we use the
ratio of the true cost of living indices of two demographically diﬀerent households, the so
called relative equivalence scale (Blundell and Lewbel, 1991). Considering a household
with given demographic characteristics zo (e.g. a couple without children) as reference,














measures the relative compensation required by household h and the reference household
to achieve the same level of utility at post-surcharge (-subsidy) and pre-surcharge (-
subsidy) prices. For example, if a surcharge th and to per unit of consumption of a
given commodity is imposed on couples with and without children, respectively, Rho
would show the compensation required by couples with children to achieve their pre-
surcharge utility level relative to the compensation required by couples without children
to achieve their own pre-surcharge utility level.
In the case where prices are exogenous, the relative equivalence scale is determined by
the extent to which the household demand pattern is aﬀected by demographic character-
istics: for instance, Rho > 1 when items preferred by households with children increase
faster in price than items preferred by households without children; and Rho < 1i f
the opposite is true. However, under an increasing block pricing structure, the relative
equivalence scale is also aﬀected by the extent to which children (and other demographic
characteristics of the household) determine the price paid by the household. This can
be seen if we deﬁne p∗
h = shp0 and p0 = P =1 , as previously, and evaluate Rho at
uh = uo =0 . Then (11) can be written as wh = a + δ(zh)+γ lnsh, where δ(zh)i s
some function of demographic and other household characteristics aﬀecting consumer
demand, and
lnRho =( wh − .5γ lnsh)lnsh − (wo − .5γ lnso)lnso
=( wh − wo)lnsh +( l nsh − lnso)wo − .5γ[(lnsh)2 − (lnso)2]. (15)
This expression shows that diﬀerences in cost between households with and without
children (or other characteristics) caused by the imposition of a surcharge on the com-
modity of interest here, consists of three parts: (wh − wo)lnsh,r e ﬂecting diﬀerences
9in the demand patterns of two household types; (lnsh − lnso)wo, reﬂecting diﬀerences
in the price paid per unit of consumption; and .5γ[(lnsh)2 − (lnso)2], reﬂecting cost
savings from substituting away from the item in question as the block price increases.
Extending the analysis to the case where uh 6= uo 6= 0 will not change our conclusions,
but will complicate computation because Rho will then be also dependent on the level
of utility (expenditure) due to the non-homotheticity of preferences.
3 Application to demand for water
In this section we use individual household data drawn from the Cyprus Family
Expenditure Survey (FES) for the years 1996/97 to estimate residential demand for
water and provide empirical illustration of the model described in the previous section.
For each of over 2700 households randomly sampled, the FES reports its annual water
bill together with its expenditure on a large number of items, the level and sources of
its income and many household characteristics.
3.1 Estimated speciﬁcation
Water, a scarce commodity in Cyprus, is metered and priced with an increasing block
tariﬀ structure. Each of the 37 water authorities on the (government controlled part of
the) island, however, has its own pricing policy. This gives rise to a substantial water
price heterogeneity across the island, a desirable data feature for our purposes. Using
the FES standard geographical code we have allocated households to water authority
areas and calculated the level of annual water consumption and the marginal price, sh,
paid for a cubic meter (pcm) of water by each household.8
As argued in the previous section, consumer demand under an increasing block





Thm = Qh − Σmbhm−1,
and Thm−1 = A if m =1 ,
where: Qh is the water bill of the h
th household; A the ﬁxed charge; pm, the m
th block tariﬀ;a n dqhm the
quantity of water consumed by the h
th household under the m
th tariﬀ (h =1 ,...,H and m =1 ,...,M).
The marginal price of water paid by the h
th household, p
∗
h, is the price paid at max Thm, the highest
tariﬀ block. This is always unobserved because there is no free water allowance in Cyprus (Dandy,
Nguyen and Davies 1997).
10pricing structure can be modelled as the outcome of a two-stage optimisation procedure
involving the choice of block and, thereby, the marginal price (ﬁr s ts t a g e )a n dt h e
quantity demanded within the block (second stage). The fact that each water authority
in Cyprus has its own tariﬀ structure, block pricing across the island is treated here as
a continuous variable. More precisely, we normalise to p∗
h = sh and P =1 , as explained
in the previous section, and consider the marginal price paid by the hth household to
be determined by the reduced from equation,
sh = ε + εoIh + Σkεkzkh + regional dummies + vh, (16)
where ε,εo,d m and εk are parameters; Ih is the level of household income; zkh, k =
1,...K,are household characteristics reﬂecting the size and age composition of the family,
the size of accommodation, the presence of various types of shower and toilette facilities,
the ownership of washing machine, dishwasher and other household variables thought
to aﬀect the price blocks corresponding to the choice of water consumption (a list of the
variables included in the zkh vector is shown in the ﬁrst column of Table 1); and vh is
an error term.
For demand at the lower stage we use the QUAIDS budget share equation discussed
in the previous section and assume that household characteristics enter the price func-
tions (8) linearly,




g (sh,zh)=( λ + Σkξkzkh)lnsh.
resulting in the budget share equation,











where lnYh =l n yh − ao +( a + Σkδkzkh)lnsh − .5γ (lns)
2
h and eh is an error term.
The parameters δk and γ show the eﬀect of the kth household characteristics and the
marginal price on the budget share, respectively. Also β and λ show the eﬀect of the
log budget and the log budget square on the budget share, respectively; and φk and ξk
show how the latter two eﬀects vary with the kth household characteristics. Notably, the
only φk and ξk parameters found to be signiﬁcant in our empirical analysis are those
corresponding the dummy indicating whether the household head is in retirement. The
parameter ao corresponds to the level of ‘subsistence’ budget.9
9This parameter is generally ﬁxed in empirical application to avoid diﬃculties in the joint estimation
113.2 Empirical results
Equations (16) and (18) are estimated simultaneously by nonlinear Full Information
Maximum Likelihood (FIML). Table 1 reports the parameter estimates (together with
their standard errors and diagnostic statistics) obtained from these equations.10 As
expected, both adults and children in the household have a positive and signiﬁcant
eﬀect on the marginal price through increased consumption. More precisely, an adult
in the household contributes to a 2.3% increase in the price paid pcm at the margin
of water consumption while the increase in the marginal price caused by a child is 1%.
Furthermore, adults have a signiﬁcant, albeit small, eﬀect on the budget share of water.
The rest of the parameters reported in Table 1 also conform to expectation. The
presence of a washing machine in the household increases consumption (and, thereby,
the marginal price) and the budget share of water; whereas the eﬀect of a dishwasher
is insigniﬁcant, indicating that dishwashing by hand does not require less water than
machine dishwashing. The size of accommodation has a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect on
the marginal price and the budget share of water. The presence of a shower (in addition
to having a bathroom without shower) either inside or outside the house appears to
encourage water consumption. In contrast the eﬀect of having toilette facilities outside
t h eh o u s ei sn o ts i g n i ﬁcantly diﬀe r e n tf r o mn o th a v i n gat o i l e t t ea ta l l ,a p p a r e n t l y
because, in general, toilettes outside the house do not have a ﬂash. The presence of a
toilette inside the house, however, has a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect on the budget share
of water, reﬂecting the fact that for households with a toilette inside the house, water
is more of a necessity than for households without toilette. The opposite is true for the
presence of running water facility in the house.
Households with heads in agriculture appear to consume less water than other house-
holds. This, however, is likely to reﬂect the fact that these household tend to buy less
water from their local authority because they have access to their own sources of un-
derground water. Households with a retired head do not pay a higher marginal price
for water (do not consume more water) than other households in similar circumstances,
but have a relatively higher budget share of water. This is not surprising, given that
there are many more goods other than water in the consumption opportunities of a
of this parameter and the intercept of the budget share equations. Here we ﬁx ao to the log of the
average budget of households in the lowest 1% of the budget distribution in our sample.
10The parameter estimates corresponding to the 37 regional dummies are not reported in Table 1
because are of no interest here. The empirical estimates of these parameters are available from the
authors on request.
12non-retired than a retired person. Also not surprising is the ﬁnding that log income has
an insigniﬁcant eﬀect on the marginal price of water because, this eﬀect is conditional
on the rest of the variables in the log price equation. In other words, it suggests that
increased water usage is eﬀected through the presence of a large number of persons in
the family living in a large size accommodation with sanitary facilities and not through
high income itself.
Table 1: Parameter estimates of log price and budget share equations
Log price  Budget share 
Variable 
Parameter t-ratio Parameter  t-ratio 
Intercept 1.14436  15.0  0.04538  9.9 
Number of adults  0.02323  3.9  0.00057  3.2 
Number of children  0.01032  2.5  0.00041  3.6 
Washing  machine  0.10911 8.2  0.00198 5.2 
Dish washer  0.00306  0.3  -0.00032  -0.9 
Square meters of dwelling  0.00023  2.5  0.00001  2.8 
Shower  inside  0.07758 1.8  0.00371 2.5 
Shower  outside  0.08427 2.5  0.00141 1.7 
Toilette inside  -0.04785  -0.9  -0.00463  -2.8 
Toilette outside  -0.03964  -0.9  -0.00149  -1.4 
Running  water  0.03233 1.0  0.00396 3.6 
Head in agriculture  -0.02286  -1.2  0.00028  0.6 
Head retired  -0.00279  -0.2  0.01734  3.2 
Sewage  system  0.00115 6.3  0.00003 5.0 
Log income  0.00660  0.8          -         - 
Log marginal price          -         -  0.00142  4.4 
Log budget          -         -  -0.01773  -7.7 
Log budget square          -         -  0.00148  5.0 
Log budget x retired          -         -  -0.00859  -2.8 
Log budget sq x retired          -         -  0.00104  2.5 
R-Square .8027  .4223 
Root MSE  .19167  .004865 
Log Likelihood  10420.8 
Number of observations  2468 
The logarithm of marginal price has a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the budget share of water.
T h ef a c tt h a tt h i se ﬀect is positive implies an own price elasticity of demand below unity,
13in absolute size. More precisely, the average price elasticity implied by the parameters
reported in Table 1 is around -0.6. The budget level has a negative eﬀect on the budget
share, suggesting that water is a necessity (more so for household with a retired head).
A c c o r d i n gt ot h e s eﬁndings the average budget elasticity of demand for water is around
0.3.
Using the parameter estimates reported in Table 1 and taking the single adult house-
hold as reference we have computed the relative equivalence scales at diﬀerent budget
levels (in multiples of subsistence budget, ao) for three household types: couples without
children, couples with one child and couples with two children. The results of these cal-
culations, expressed as a percentage of the average water bill, are shown in the diagram
of Figure 1.
Figure 1: Relative equivalence scales
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Couple Couple + 1 child Couple + 2 children
As expected, households with more members face a higher cost of living and, as
argued in the previous section, the additional cost for these households comes from two
sources: (i) the increased consumption of water resulting in a higher marginal price of
water due to the increasing block pricing structure; and (ii) the increased budget share
of water because a household with more members sharing the same budget is a poorer
household, spending a higher share of its budget on necessities.
14As seen from the diagram of Figure 1, at subsistence income households with two
adults need to spend an extra 6.3% of the average water bill to be at the same utility
level as single adult households, while this ﬁgure doubles when two children are also
included in the family. As the budget level increases the additional spending required
by households with more members to be on the same utility level as the single adult
households decreases. This is because the budget elasticity of demand for water is below
unity, therefore, the weight attached to water in the calculation of the true cost of living
of the household becomes smaller as the budget level increases.
4 Conclusion
Contrary to equity arguments invoked among other considerations to justify an in-
creasing block pricing regime for water, large families are in a disadvantage under this
pricing regime because they face a higher marginal price of water than small families at
the same level of utility. We substantiate this argument in the context of a utility max-
imization framework where household demand for water is modeled as a budget share
equation of an integrable complete demand system. We use a two-stage budgeting ap-
proach based on implicit separability to model price endogeneity at the theoretical level
and use FIML methods to obtain consistent estimates of the water demand parameters
at both budgeting stages.
We use the results to construct a relative equivalence scale, measuring the compen-
sation required by large families for paying a higher marginal price of water than small
families. Empirical results obtained from individual household date, drawn from the
Cyprus Family Expenditure Survey 1996/1997, suggest that the cost of water consump-
tion for households at low budget levels increases due to the block pricing structure by
6.3% of the average water bill when one adult and by 3% when one child is added to the
family. For example, if the average water bill is $100, low budget households pay $6.3
more for an additional adult and $3 more for an additional child due to the increasing
block price regime. This cost does not, of course, include the additional outlay required
to purchase more units of water at base level prices, i.e. in the absence of the increasing
block price regime, there would be no additional demographic costs.
Another ﬁnding with potentially important policy implications emerging from our
analysis is that the cost diﬀerence between small and large families caused by increasing
block pricing declines with the budget level. Being a direct consequence of the low bud-
get elasticity of demand for water, this ﬁnding suggests that when an increasing block
15pricing regime is imposed on necessities large families at the bottom end of income dis-
tribution are the most disadvantaged. This strengthens the argument for compensating
diﬀerences between small and large families to account for the eﬀects of increasing block
pricing.
Although this paper is about behavioural and welfare implications associated with an
increasing block pricing regime applied to water, the analysis has applications to other
goods and services subject to a changing block price regime (electricity, recycling etc)
and other areas where the price diﬀerentiation eﬀect on households varies demographic
characteristics, such as reduced tax rates on children goods.
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